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SAVE AMATEUR SPORTS: PROTECTION FROM LIABILITY
UNDER THE AMATEUR SPORTS ACT IN
ELEVEN LINE v. NORTH TEXAS
SOCCER ASS'N
I. INTRODUCTION
Michael Jordan, Joe Montana and Mark McGwire are legends
in their respective sports.' It is debatable, however, whether these
players would have been able to raise their level of athletic excel-
lence to such heights without an organized forum to develop their
abilities when they were amateur athletes. In the early to mid-
1970's, bureaucracy, inefficiency and incompetence plagued the or-
ganization and management of amateur sports in the United
States.2 These pitfalls affected the athletes at that time and
threatened the foundations of amateur sports for future genera-
tions to come. 3
1. See Tom Verducci, The Greatest Season Ever, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 5,
1998, at 38, 38 (stating Michael Jordan and Mark McGwire are two of greatest
finishers in all of sports); Steve Wulf, Sportsman of the Year, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Dec. 23, 1991, at 82, 82 (remarkingJoe Montana was one of greatest players to ever
don football uniform).
2. SeeJAMEs A.R. NAF ZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAw 165-67 (1988) (re-
counting serious problem which plagued amateur sports in United States during
1970s); Thomas A. Mayes, Comment, Tonya Harding's Case: Contractual Due Process,
the Amateur Athlete, and the American Ideal of Fair Play, 3 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 109, 124-
25 (1995) (noting that amateur athletics before Amateur Sports Act was overrun
with jurisdictional disputes leading to rivalry amongst organizations). For a discus-
sion of specific examples indicating the problems that arose in amateur sports dur-
ing that time, see infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
3. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1627, at 8-9 (1978) (reporting findings of President's
Commission, which sought to correct disorganization and factional disputes plagu-
ing amateur sports); see also NAFZIGER, supra note 2, at 167 (describing report pre-
pared for Congress that indicated athletes were being affected by jurisdictional
feuds and fragmented organization). The Senate, in discussing the problems that
athletes faced, specifically indicated the root of the problems by stating:
The sport community recognizes the futility of so many of their past dis-
putes which have inhibited the progress of this Nation's amateur athletic
programs. America's weakness in sports is certainly not for want of talent
nor lack of resources. Our difficulties lie in failing to join together for
the purpose of increasing athletic opportunities. We need to encourage
physical fitness and provide more and better athletic programs.
S. REP. No. 95-770, at 3-4 (1978).
(387)
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Concern regarding the state of amateur athletics eventually led
Congress to enact the Amateur Sports Act of 19784 ("Act").5 The
purpose of the Act was to resolve these concerns by redistributing
the power to oversee amateur athletics in an effort to advance na-
tional goals in a uniform and efficient manner.6 The Act subse-
quently established a vertical structure headed by the United States
Olympic Committee ("USOC") and subordinate National Gov-
erning Bodies.7 The USOC oversees United States amateur athlet-
ics as a whole, while each National Governing Body ("NGB")
oversees the management of a particular sport.8 Both the USOC
and the individual NGBs were given broad powers and exclusive
jurisdiction to govern amateur sports. 9 In granting exclusive juris-
4. The Amateur Sports Act of 1978 was amended in 1998 and may now be
referred to as "The Ted Turner Stevens Amateur Sports Act." See 36 U.S.C.
§ 220501(a) (1998). For the purpose of this casenote, the pre-amended statute
shall be cited throughout most of the casenote, with parentheticals referencing the
amended statute.
5. See Oldfield v. Athletics Cong., 779 F.2d 505, 506 (9th Cir. 1985) (increas-
ing confusion and bitterness among amateur sports organizations led Congress to
take action); Robert N. Davis, 1996 AALS Sports Law Conference: Legal Issues and the
Olympic Movement: Ambushing the Olympic Games, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENrr. L.J. 423, 435-
36 (1996) (passing of Amateur Sports Act by Congress occurred after recommen-
dations were made indicating turmoil surrounding amateur sports); Vernon A.
Nelson, Jr., Comment, Butch Reynolds and the American Judicial System v. the Interna-
tional Amateur Athletic Federation -A Comment on the Need for Judicial Restraint, 3 SETON
HALLJ. SPORT L. 173, 176 (1993) (enacting Act was direct result of research revel-
ing state of amateur athletics).
The President's Commission on Olympic Sports ("Commission") was created
in 1975 after an apparent decline in amateur sports. See Nelson, supra, at 176. The
Commission was to research amateur sports, determine the root of the problem
and propose solutions. See NAFZIGER, supra note 2, at 167. The Commission rec-
ommended that Congress enact the Act. See Nelson, supra, at 176.
6. See S. REP. No. 95-770, at 17 (1978) (describing one main purpose of USOC
was to "establish national goals for amateur athletic activity in the United States");
NAFZIGER, supra note 2, at 171-73 (detailing national goals established under Act);
see also Melissa R. Bitting, Comment, Mandatory, Binding Arbitration for Olympic Ath-
letes: Is the Process Better or Worse for "fob Security"?, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 655, 657
(focusing on national goals for amateur athletics was key objective of Act).
7. See S. REP. No. 95-770, at 3-4 (1978) (stating that recommendations to Con-
gress favored erection of vertical structure to control amateur sports). For further
explanation of the vertical structure established under the Act and the roles of
USOC and NGBs, see infra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
8. For a further discussion of the responsibilities and authority of the USOC
and NGBs, see infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
9. See 36 U.S.C. § 374(4) (1978) (current version at 36 U.S.C. § 220503(a) (4)
(1998)) (enumerating objectives and purposes of USOC); see also Edward E. Hollis
III, Note, The United States Olympic Committee and the Suspension of Athletes: Reforming
Grievance Procedures Under the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 71 IND. L.J. 183, 186 (1995)
(defining duties of USOC). For a further discussion of the powers granted to the
USOC and NGBs, see infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 8: p. 387
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diction to these entities, Congress indicated its intent to keep the
regulation of amateur sports out of the courtroom. 10
In Eleven Line v. North Texas State Soccer Ass'n,11 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed whether the
Act exempts a state association, subordinate to a NGB, from federal
antitrust laws.' 2 The Fifth Circuit held that the Act does not pro-
vide such an exemption.' 3
This Note will discuss the congressional intent in enacting the
Act and the rights and privileges given to entities established under
the Act. Specifically, it will focus on whether the Act provides an
implied exemption from antitrust laws, and more generally, if
NGBs and state associations can be sued for eligibility rules they
establish.' 4 Part II of this Note details the facts underlying Eleven
Line.15 Part III provides a background of the events leading up to
the enactment of the Act and an explanation of the vertical struc-
ture it established.' 6 Part III also details the background surround-
ing implied exemptions from antitrust laws and the rights of parties
to bring suit against entities established by the Act. 17 Part IV dis-
cusses the holding and rationale of the Fifth Circuit's ruling in
10. See Nelson, supra note 5, at 182 (discussing Congress's intent and actions
to limit role courts would play in amateur sports, leaving USOC and NGBs with
power to establish remedies to settle disputes); see alsoJames A.R. Nafziger, Interna-
tional Sports Laur. A Reply of Characteristics and Trends, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 489, 509
(recognizing that courts give deference to sports organizations to enforce their
own rules); David B. Mack, Note, Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Federation:
The Need for an Independent Tribunal in International Athletic Disputes, 10 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 653, 657 (1995) (reviewing legislative history reveals that courts were to be
left out of disputes involving USOC and NGBs).
11. 213 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 2000).
12. See Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 199 (hearing case involving plaintiff who claims
his company lost money due to specific rule enacted by state association). State
associations are members of a given NGB. See id. at 201. The purpose of the state
association is to carry out the goals of its NGB in the particular state in which the
associations is incorporated. See id.
13. See id. at 204 (holding state associations are not afforded same exemption
from antitrust laws as national governing bodies).
14. See Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n, 884 F.2d 524, 529-30 (10th Cir.
1989) (holding implied exemption from antitrust law existed for NGB); Oldfield v.
Athletic Cong., 779 F.2d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding plaintiff did not have
private right of action to sue under Act).
15. For a discussion of the facts of Eleven Line, see infra notes 21-39 and ac-
companying text.
16. For a discussion of the history of amateur athletics in the United States
and the events that compelled Congress to enact the Act, see infra notes 40-52 and
accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of cases involving implied exemptions from antitrust laws
and the right to sue under the Act, see infra notes 53-91 and accompanying text.
2002]
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Eleven Line.18 Part V presents a critical analysis of the Fifth Circuit's
decision. 19 Part VI concludes this note with a discussion of the po-
tential negative impact the Fifth Circuit's opinion might have on
amateur athletics. 20
II. FACTS
In Eleven Line v. North Texas State Soccer Ass'n, the Fifth Circuit
examined whether non-profit volunteer state and local soccer as-
sociations were exempt from federal antitrust laws.21 In 1990 Tom
Higginson, the president of Eleven Line, Inc., opened The Permian
Basin Sports Center ("PBSC"), an indoor soccer arena in Midland,
Texas. 22 Higginson was drawn to the Midland area because of its
ebullience towards the game of soccer and a belief that participa-
tion in indoor soccer would continue to rise. 23 The PBSC, which
served as a facility both for youths and adults, housed various
leagues and interstate soccer tournaments. 24
The PBSC was less than successful in its first five years of exis-
tence. 25 In 1995, due to "insufficient revenue and a manager 'who
was not very good at depositing [revenue]'," the PBSC had to close
its doors for 5 months from June through October.2 6 The PBSC's
reopening in November 1995 led to the events from which this suit
arose.
27
The North Texas State Soccer Association ("NTSSA"), a volun-
teer non-profit state association, governs amateur athletic participa-
18. For a discussion of the courts holding and analysis, see infra notes 92-118
and accompanying text.
19. For a critical discussion of the court's opinion in Eleven Line, see infra
notes 119-79 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the impact the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Eleven Line
will have on amateur athletics, see infra notes 180-90 and accompanying text.
21. See 213 F.3d at 198 (reviewing grievance involving eligibility rule).
22. See id. at 200. Higginson had an affinity for the game of soccer, which he
converted into several business ventures that included, among other things, the
opening of soccer arenas in various parts of the country. See id.
23. See id. After a four to five day visit to Midland, including attending a semi-
pro soccer game and speaking with locals, Higginson bought the building that was
to house the soccer arena. See id.
24. See id. The youths ranged in age from six to nineteen and were generally
outdoor players looking to hone their soccer skills in the winter and summer off-
seasons. See id. The adult leagues on the other hand ran year round. See id.
25. See id. at 200 (detailing financial difficulties endured by PBSC). PBSC's
gross revenue peaked in 1991 at $108,000. See id. Higginson's investors continu-
ally had to inject capital into the business every year, and even with the added
assistance PBSC fell behind on its pay roll and property taxes. See id.
26. Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 200.
27. See id.
[Vol. 8: p. 387
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tion in soccer for northern Texas. 28 The NTSSA is a member of the
United States Soccer Federation ("USSF"), which is the NGB for
the sport of soccer for the United States.
29
The NTSSA enacted a rule in the 1980s entitled the "unsanc-
tioned play rule," which stated, inter alia, that players who played in
unsanctioned leagues would lose a year of eligibility in the NT-
SSA.30 When the PBSC first opened, Higginson "chose not to join
the NTSSA as a 'sanctioned' facility because he disagreed with some
of the organization's rules and felt that NTSSA would raise his costs
and interfere with his management prerogatives."
3 1
In 1995, the Midland Soccer Association ("MSA") elected a
new president who began strictly enforcing the rules promulgated
by the NTSSA, specifically the unsanctioned play rule.3 2 This issue
was initiated at the MSA's board meeting, which took place in No-
vember 1995, shortly after PBSC reopened.3 3 Enforcement of this
rule resulted in a significant decrease in the level of participation at
PBSC due to rumors that the unsanctioned play rule would now be
strictly enforced and would expose PBSC participants to eligibility
28. See id. at 201 (discussing organization of entities that oversee participation
of amateur athletes in soccer). Due to the popularity of the sport in Midland and
the neighboring Odessa region, the Midland Soccer Association ("MSA") and the
Odessa Soccer Association ("OSA") were established as members of the NTSSA.
See id. The purpose of these associations was to aid the success of outdoor soccer
through the assistance of numerous volunteers spending countless hours building
soccer fields, raising money and training players and coaches. See id.
29. See id. For detailed discussion of the vertical structure erected by Con-
gress and the significance of the NTSSA and the USSF, see infra notes 40-52 and
accompanying text.
30. Id. (detailing provisions of "unsanctioned play rule"). The eligibility rule
established by the NTSSA states:
3.2 Youth and amateur players or teams who participate with unregis-
tered players or engage in unsanctioned play shall void their NTSSA re-
gistration and must apply for reinstatement to their appropriate Youth or
Amateur Commissioner, along with a refilling fee of $2 per player.
3.2.1. Unsanctioned play rule shall include, but not be limited to:
1. Outdoor/indoor league not sanctioned by NTSSA or another USSF
affiliate.
2. Outdoor/indoor tournament not sanctioned by the NTSSA or an-
other USSF affiliate.
3. Any game (friendly or scrimmage) with a non-USSF affiliate.
Id.
31. See Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 200 (enumerating financial reason why Higgin-
son decided not to become sanctioned by NTSSA).
32. See id. at 201-02 (indicating players and coaches could no longer use
PBSC, an unsanctioned facility, without being subject to eligibility risks). The fact
that PBSC was an unsanctioned facility did not seem to pose a problem because
the facility shut down and was not expected to reopen. See id. For a description of
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risks. 34 Due to a reduction in the number of competitors who en-
rolled in PBSC's various leagues, PBSC was forced to close its doors
permanently after six months.
3 5
Eleven Line, Inc. subsequently brought an antitrust suit against
the NTSSA, MSA and Odessa Soccer Association ("OSA") in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. 36
The jury found for the plaintiff on the antitrust claim and awarded
damages for lost profits. 37 The NTSSA appealed the District
Court's decision, claiming that the Act immunized them from fed-
eral antitrust laws. 38 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's
holding that the NTSSA was not immune from federal antitrust
laws, but then overturned the award of damages.39
III. BACKGROUND
A. Amateur Sports Act
In 1978, Congress passed the Amateur Sports Act to "correct
the disorganization and the serious factional disputes that seem-
ingly plagued amateur sports. '40 The President's Commission on
34. See id. (discussing MSA's actions regarding enforcement of unsanctioned
play rule).
35. See id. (describing decrease in number of athletes competing at PBSC).
PBSC's business declined from 105 youth and adult teams from the previous win-
ter to forty-three for the following winter. See id.
36. See Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 199-205 (outlining arguments put forth by each
side and detailing reasons why Court of Appeals overruled District Court). For a
description of OSA, see supra note 28.
37. See id. at 199 (detailing verdict of jury in finding for plaintiff). The jury
found that the plaintiff was put out of business by the enactment of the NTSSA's
unsanctioned play rule, which in essence, dictated where the area's amateur soccer
players and coaches could participate in athletic competition. See id. The jury
then awarded Eleven Line $100,000 for the damages it incurred because of NT-
SSA's actions, and the Court enjoined the NTSSA from enforcing the unsanc-
tioned play rule. See id.
38. See id. at 203-05 (detailing analysis court used in affirming District Court's
decision). For a discussion of the Act, its history, provisions and impact, see infra
notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
39. See Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 204-09. For a discussion of the Court's ratio-
nale in affirming the district court's ruling regarding immunization from federal
antitrust law, see infra notes 92-118 and accompanying text.
40. H.R. REP. No. 95-1627, at 8 (1978) (discussing Congress's intent in enact-
ing Act); see also Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 203 (viewing Act as establishing hierarchi-
cal structure to oversee organization of amateur athletics); S.F. Arts & Athletics,
Inc., v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 544 (1987) (describing pur-
pose of enacting Act was to bring stability to management of amateur athletics).
The Act was the culmination of nearly a century of regulation of Olympic
athletes. The modern Olympics began its resurgence in Paris in 1894 when the
Congress of Paris established the International Olympic Committee ("IOC") for
the purpose of organizing and supervising the "Olympic movement" and resur-
recting the Olympic Games. See Mack, supra note 10, at 657 (discussing establish-
Vol. 8: p. 387
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Olympic Sports ("Commission") recommended passing the Act as a
solution to the problems that plagued amateur athletics. 41 The
Commission sought legislation to address growing concerns over in-
adequate performances by U.S. amateur athletes in international
competition.
42
ment of IOC). The IOC's charter empowers it with "supreme authority" over the
"Olympic Movement," the goal of which is to "place everywhere sport at the service
of the harmonious development of man . . . to promote peace." INTERNATIONAL
OLYMPIC COMMITTEE CHARTER, Fundamental Principles § 3, http://
www.olympic.org/ioc/e/facts/charter/charter-introe.html (last visited Aug. 31,
2001). The IOC, in order to promote the Olympic Movement and revive the
Olympic Games, is instilled with the power to recognize National Olympic Com-
mittees ("NOC") whose goals are to "develop and protect the Olympic Movement
in their respective countries." Id. at Rules 3, 31.
In 1896, the United States Olympic Committee ("USOC") was created in or-
der to represent the United States in the IOC. See Nelson, supra note 5, at 176
(describing early period of USOC). The USOC was later incorporated in 1950 and
given a federal charter by Congress, instilling it with sole dominion over amateur
athletics that pertained to the Olympic Games. See DeFrantz v. United States
Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1183 (D.D.C. 1980) (noting purpose of incor-
porating USOC).
Unfortunately, in the middle of the 1970's, there was a decline in the competi-
tiveness put forth by the United States in international competition. See NAFZIGER,
supra note 2, at 165 (illustrating problems in 1972 Munich Olympics). This de-
cline was due to, among other things, poor administration and an overflow of bu-
reaucracy. See id. at 165-66. In 1975, in order to address these problems, the
President's Commission on Olympic Sports (hereinafter "Commission") was cre-
ated. See H.R. REP. 95-1627 at 8 (describing evident fall of American competitive-
ness which was occurring at significantly lower level than what nation, due to its
size, was capable of achieving); Nelson, supra note 5, at 176 (indicating Commis-
sion was established to remedy disorganization that permeated through amateur
athletics). The Commission, after investigating the matter, recommended that
Congress enact the Amateur Sports Act. See id.
41. SeeNelson, supranote 5, at 176 (noting aim of Commission was to propose
best method of correcting disorganization of amateur sports in United States).
The purpose of the Commission was to "reorganiz[e] the structure of amateur
athletics" in the United States for the purpose of producing a higher level of suc-
cess in international competition. Id.; see also NAFZIGER, supra note 2, at 167 (indi-
cating goal of Commission was to determine inadequacies of United States
Olympic program and offer solutions). The Commission's findings and recom-
mendations led to the enactment of the Act. See Nelson, supra note 5, at 176-77
(detailing Commission's findings heavily favored reorganization of USOC).
42. See NAFZIGER, supra note 2, at 165-67 (enumerating problems that plagued
United States in its participation in international competition). The inadequacy of
the United States Olympic framework came to the forefront at the 1972 Olympic
games in Munich, where "administrative faux pas ... beset the United States
Team." Id. at 166. Examples of these errors include sprinters failing to qualify in
their events due to improper information from their coaches regarding the start
time of their events; the stripping of a gold metal from a swimmer because the
team doctor failed to recognize the athlete's drug list contained a stimulant pro-
hibited by the IOC; and U.S. officials incompetently appealing a loss to the Soviet
Union in the men's basketball gold medal game, when referees made extremely
controversial decisions. See id.
There were other problems besides those, which appeared in Munich. See
Neil Amdur, Olympic Group: Tower of Babel, N.Y. TimES, Nov. 5 1972, § 5 at 4, col. 3.
20021 393
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The Commission recommended to Congress that the most ef-
fective way to govern amateur athletics was to restructure and
broaden the powers of the USOC. 43 Congress, empowering the
USOC "to act as the coordinating body for amateur athletic activ-
ity," subsequently created the Act.44 The Act established a vertical
structure to govern United States amateur athletics. 45 The USOC,
which heads the structure, is vested with "exclusive jurisdiction ...
over all matters" concerning United States amateur athletics and
the power to resolve all conflicts and disputes that could arise.46
USOC officials were thought to have insufficient experience, were too far removed
from their sport to offer valuable input and were not concerned with legitimate
issues of athletes. See N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1972, at 40, col. 1.
43. See Nelson, supra note 5, at 176 (discussing findings of Commission); see
alsoJillJ. Newman, The Race Does Not Always Go to the Stronger or Faster Man... But to
the One Who Goes to Court! An Examination of Reynolds v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, et
al., SPORTS LAW. J. 205, 210-11 (1994) (enumerating findings of Commission that
USOC needed to be main authority with respect to amateur sports in United
States). For further discussion of the creation of the USOC, see infra notes 44-47
and accompanying text.
44. S. REP. No. 95-770, at 4 (1978) (discussing purpose of enacting Act). The
Act established the USOC as a corporation and set forth its broad powers and goals
in overseeing amateur athletes with respect to both national and international
competition. See Mack, supra note 10, at 654 (noting passage of Act would seek to
ensure administrative mistakes made at 1972 Munich Olympics would not reoccur
in future competitions). Congress intended to instill broad powers in the USOC
with the purpose of:
[Bringing] amateur sports organizations together and establish [ing] lines
of communication in order that mutual goals and priorities can be real-
ized and problems resolved. The USOC should encourage amateur
sports organizations to settle differences, to overcome shared deficien-
cies, and to produce more integrated programs so that a meaningful as-
sembly of sports organizations will exist to respond to the needs of this
Nation's amateur athletes.
S. REP. No. 95-770, at 4.
Section 374 of the Act pronounced that the purpose of the USOC was to,
among other things:
(1) establish national goals for amateur athletic activities and encourage
the attainment of those goals;
(2) coordinate and develop amateur athletic activity in the United States
directly relating to international amateur athletic competition, so as
to foster productive working relationships among sports-related
organizations
36 U.S.C. § 374 (1978) (current version at 36 U.S.C. §§ 220522(a)(1), (2) (1998)
respectively).
45. See Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 203 (indicating vertical structure was most effi-
cient way to manage amateur sports).
46. 36 U.S.C. § 374 (current version at 36 U.S.C. § 220503(a) (3), (8) (1998)).
Section 374 states in pertinent part:
(a) The objects and purposes of the [USOC] shall be to-
(3) exercise exclusive jurisdiction, either directly or through its con-
stituent members or committees, over all matters pertaining to
the participation of the United States in the Olympic Games and
in the Pan-American Games ...
[Vol. 8: p. 387
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Congress also instilled the USOC with the power to recognize NGBs
to oversee each particular sport represented in the Olympics. 47
The NGB for soccer in the United States is the USSF.4 8 The
USSF consists of members that include, among others, state associa-
tions that have exclusive jurisdiction over soccer in their particular
(8) provide for the swift resolution of conflicts and disputes involv-
ing amateur athletes, national governing bodies, and amateur
sports organizations, and protect the opportunity of any amateur
athlete, coach, trainer, manager, administrator, or official to par-
ticipate in amateur athletic competition.
Id. See also 36 U.S.C. § 375 which states:
(a) The [USOC] shall have perpetual succession and power to-
(1) serve as the coordinating body for amateur athletic activity in the
United States directly relating to international amateur athletic
competition;
(2) represent the United States as its national Olympic committee in
relations with the International Olympic Committee ...
(4) recognize eligible amateur sports organizations as national gov-
erning bodies for any sport which is included on the program of
the Olympic Games or the Pan-American Games.
Id. (current version at 36 U.S.C. § 220505(c)(1), (2), (4) (1998)).
47. See 36 U.S.C. § 391(a) (1978) (current version at 36 U.S.C. §§ 220521,
220522 (1998)) (elaborating USOC's power to recognize NGBs and enumerating
requirements to establish NGBs). 36 U.S.C. § 391 (a) provides:
(a) National governing body; application; notice and hearing:
For any sport which is included on the program of the Olympic
Games or the Pan-American Games, the [USOC] is authorized to rec-
ognize as a national governing body an amateur sports organization
which files an application and is eligible for such recognition ...
36 U.S.C. § 391 (a) (1978) (current version at 36 U.S.C. § 220521 (a) (1998)).
The USOC, in § 391 (b), identifies certain requirements a sports organization
must meet in order to become eligible as an NGB. See 36 U.S.C. § 391(b) (1978)
(current version at 36 U.S.C. § 220522 (1998)). Section 391(b) requires in part:
(b) Eligibility requirements
No amateur sports organization is eligible to be recognized or is eli-
gible to continue to be recognized as a national governing body un-
less it-
(1) is incorporated under the laws of any of the several States of the
United States or the District of Columbia as a not-for-profit cor-
poration having as its purpose the advancement of amateur ath-
letic competition ...
(4) demonstrates that it is autonomous in the governance of its
sport, in that it independently determines and controls all mat-
ters central to such governance, does not delegate such determi-
nation and control...
(11) provides procedures for the prompt and equitable resolution of
grievances of its members
Id.
48. See Bylaws of the United States Soccer Federation, Bylaw 103 §2, http://
www.us-soccer.com/members/1918_fin.pdf (Aug. 22, 1998) (recognizing USSF as
NGB for sport of soccer).
The USSF "shall be autonomous in its governance of the sport of soccer in the
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State. 49 The state association for the northern part of Texas is the
NTSSA.50 A number of local associations exist under each state as-
sociation to further assist in the development of the particular sport
in different areas of the state. The MSA and OSA develop soccer
participation in the Midland and Odessa counties respectively. 51
Therefore, the vertical structure for soccer in the northern part of
Texas consists of a three-tiered hierarchy, beginning with the USSF
on the national level, and ending with the MSA and OSA on the
local level. 52
B. Lack of Judicial Remedy under the Amateur Sports Act
Courts, in general, have found that disputes involving eligibil-
ity standards, which arise under the auspices of the Act, should not
be brought to the courtroom for resolution. 53 Courts have used
different rationales to dismiss claims brought under the Act.54
These rationales include an implied exemption from antitrust laws,
a requirement to exhaust all other remedies, and a lack of a private
right of action.
49. See id. at Bylaw 202 (1) (E) (listing organizations that comprise USSF). A
state association is defined as "the administrative body within a territory ... to
carry out the Federation's programs for amateur youth or amateur adult players,
or both." Id. at Bylaw 109(2). The state associations are bound to the USSF's
"articles of incorporation, bylaws, policies and requirements on interplay." Id. at
Bylaw 213 §(1)(a)(6).
50. See Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 201.
51. See id. at 201.
52. See id. at 201 (discussing structure of organizations overseeing amateur
soccer in Texas).
53. See Nafziger, supra note 10, at 509-10 (indicating that while courts are
more willing to hear cases brought by amateur athletes, traditionally courts "have
dismissed actions on grounds of admissibility"); Newman, supra note 43, at 213
(discussing actions of courts either dismissing actions by amateur athletes against
NGBs or deferring to rules of governing bodies in construing ruling); see also Nel-
son, supra note 5, at 182 (asserting that courts, in following Congress's intent, dis-
miss claims brought under Act because they lack subject matter jurisdiction over
claims brought by amateur athletes).
54. See Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n 884 F.2d 524, 530-32 (10th Cir.
1989) (holding that there is implied exemption from federal antitrust laws due to
Congress's intent in enacting Act); see also Oldfield v. Athletic Cong., 779 F.2d 505,
508 (9th Cir. 1985) (existing "administrative mechanisms for resolution of disputes
over an athlete's right to compete still further betokens the absence of an implied
private right."); Michels v. United States Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155, 157 (7th
Cir. 1984) (finding no private right of action under Act existed for weightlifter
suspended for drug use); Barnes v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 862 F. Supp.
1537, 1545 (S.D.W. Va. 1993) (holding Congress intended amateur athletes to ex-
haust administrative remedies that exist within Act and keep such disputes out of
federal court); Devereaux v. Amateur Softball Ass'n, 768 F. Supp. 618, 625 (S.D.
Ohio 1991) (seeking redress in court before exhausting administrative remedies
was premature).
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1. Implied Exemption from Federal Antitrust Laws
In Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n of the United States,55 the
court addressed whether the Amateur Basketball Association, an
NGB, is exempt from federal antitrust laws. 56 In analyzing the al-
leged antitrust violations, the court noted that the provisions of the
Act do not expressly provide an exemption from federal antitrust
laws.57 Therefore, if an exemption from antitrust laws exists, it
must be implied and "implied antitrust immunity is not favored." 58
55. 884 F.2d 524 (10th Cir. 1989).
56. See Behagen, 884 F.2d at 525 (hearing appeal from jury verdict granting
damages under antitrust laws). The plaintiff in Behagen, Ronald Behagen, was a
former collegiate All-American basketball player at the University of Minnesota.
See Randy Harvey, Olympics Could Enjoy a Touch of Magic, Bird; Pending Rules Changes
would Make Most Professionals Eligible for the Games; If that Happens, the United States
Might Never Lose Another Gold Medal in Basketball-Unless, Unless of Course, Magic, Bird
and others Aren't Interested; That May Be the Case, Los ANGELES TIMEs, Apr. 21, 1986 at
12 (indicating Behagen's efforts in court could allow United States to send profes-
sional basketball players as participants in 1988 Olympics, an option which was not
available at that time). An NBA team subsequently drafted Behagen in 1973,
where he played for four teams in the span of six years. See id.; see also Federal Court
of Appeals Reverses Dismissal of Suit Against International Amateur Basketball Association
Brought by Former Professional Basketball Player, Because Issues of Fact Exist as to Whether
Association Is Subject to Personal Jurisdiction under Colorado's Long-arm Statute Even
Though Headquartered in Germany, Err. LAW REP., Apr. 1985, vol. 6, no.11 (giving
history of Behagen's athletic activity).
In 1979, Behagen left the NBA and joined an amateur basketball team in Si-
ena, Italy. See Behagen, 884 F.2d at 526. That league is governed by the Federation
Internationale De Basketball Amateur (hereinafter "FIBA"), which has eligibility
requirements. See id. In order for an American to play basketball internationally,
"the player is required to qualify as an amateur by receiving an ABA/USA travel
permit and a FIBA license." Id. at 525.
FIBA reinstated Behagen's amateur status and issued him a license, even
though he did not apply for a travel permit. See id. This license enabled him to
play in the Italian league during the 1979-1980 season. See id. Behagen then re-
turned to the United States and signed a contract to play for the Washington Bul-
lets of the NBA, in which he participated in eight games. See id. After the season
ended, Behagen returned to Italy to play. See id. The Executive Director of the
Amateur Basketball Association (the FIBA member for the United States) in-
formed FIBA that Behagen had again, played professional basketball. See id. This
time, FIBA advised the team in Italy that Behagen was not eligible to play as an
amateur athlete for their team. See id.
57. See Behagen, 884 F.2d at 524 (indicating there is no "explicit statement
exempting action taken under [the Act's] direction from the federal antitrust
laws"); see also 36 U.S.C. §§ 391-396 (1978).
58. United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719-20 (1974)
(indicating that implied exemptions are not favored and exist only when there is
clear discord between antitrust laws and regulatory system established by Con-
gress); see also Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 682-91 (1974) (hold-
ing casual repeals of antirust laws are not allowed, requiring dissonance between
that which is regulated and antitrust laws); Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341,
357 (1963) (repealing of antitrust laws are, as "cardinal principle" not favored);
United States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939) (stating "repeals [of antitrust
laws] by implication are not favored."); Behagen, 884 F.2d at 528 (reiterating view
2002]
11
Yiannopoulos: Save Amateur Sports: Protection from Liability under the Amateur
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
398 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
A court will find an implied exemption only if Congress clearly in-
tended such an exemption to exist.59
Issues of an implied exemption from antitrust laws arise when
Congress enacts a federal statute regulating conduct in a certain
industry, which could be contrary to antitrust provisions. 60 An ex-
emption can exist in such a case because the entity must follow the
conduct proscribed by Congress even though such action might vio-
late antirust laws. 61
that exemption through implication is not preferred); Joshua M. Fried et. al, Collu-
sive Bidding in the Market for Corporate Control, 79 NEB. L. REv. 48, 57 (2000) (detail-
ing that Securities and Exchange Act was not exempt from antitrust laws since
Congress did not provide such exemption).
59. See Behagen, 844 F.2d at 529 (stating that congressional intent is sufficient
to overcome presumption that implied exemptions from antitrust laws are disfa-
vored); United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719-20 (1974)
(finding implied exemption is only valid when "a convincing showing of clear re-
pugnancy between the antitrust laws and the regulatory system"); Silver v. N.Y.
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963) (viewing self regulating goals of Securities
and Exchange Act did not preempt application of antitrust laws); Finnegan v.
Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824, 826 (2d Cir. 1990) (indicating that antitrust laws
are not enforced when they come into conflict with those that regulatory scheme
permits).
60. See Charles K Hawley, Antitrust Problems and Solutions to Meet the Demand for
Transplantable Organs, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 1101, 1121 (1991) (detailing scenario in
which implied exemptions/repeals are recognized).
61. See id. When Congress establishes such legislation (for example the Ama-
teur Sports Act) the regulated entity (for example the USOC) claims that there is
an implied repeal of antitrust acts. See id. The repeal exists because the entity
regulated must "abide by this statute in lieu of the Sherman Act [which established
antitrust laws] and other laws." Id. Finding an implied repeal is a difficult task,
and courts look to congressional intent to "allow a regulatory scheme to achieve
goals free of antitrust laws, particularly if an agency has approved conduct and has
considered antitrust factors." Michael L. Denger, Antitrust Overview and Horizontal
Restraints of Trade, 24 ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTITRUST WORKSHOP, 7, 32-33, (Joshua F.
Greenberg 1994). A court will find that regulated conduct is implicitly immune
from antitrust laws when:
(1) When a regulatory agency has, with Congressional approval, exer-
cised explicit authority over the challenged practice itself (as distin-
guished from the general subject matter) in such a way that antitrust
enforcement would interfere with regulation .... and
(2) When regulation by an agency over an industry or some of its compo-
nents or practices is so pervasive that Congress is assumed to have
determined competition to be an inadequate means of vindicating
the public interest.
Hawley, supra note 60, at 1121. Therefore, if a court determines that Congress
intended for an implied exemption to exist, and Congress legislated in such a way
empowering an entity to exert control free from antitrust restrictions, the entity
will be exempt from antitrust laws. See id.; Behagen, 884 F.2d at 528-29.
An example of this immunity can be seen in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,
where the court addressed whether the enactment of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 provided the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") with an exemption
from antitrust laws. See Silver, 373 U.S. at 342. The case was brought after the
NYSE instructed all nonmembers to remove private wires connected to the Ex-
change which nonmembers could use to promptly obtain stock quotes. See id. at
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The Behagen court determined that Congress, in passing the
Act, intended each NGB to exercise sole and uniform control over
its particular sport.62 The court then analyzed provisions of the Act
and determined that an NGB was required to exercise monolithic
control over its sport without fear of antitrust liability.63 Therefore,
the court held that the antitrust claim brought by Behagen was
barred by the express intent of Congress. 64
2. Exhaust Administrative Remedies
In many cases involving eligibility standards, plaintiffs bring le-
gal action without first utilizing the remedies provided in the Act.6 5
343. The NYSE subsequently disapproved of all private wires without notifying the
plaintiffs, or supplying a reason and instructed all firms to disconnect their wires.
See id. at 344. Plaintiff's business suffered substantially since it could not quickly
receive stock quotes, and subsequently commenced the suit. See id. at 345.
The court found that the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 was created,
instilling the Securities and Exchange Commission with regulatory authority to
recommend and object to rules promulgated by the various exchanges. See Silver,
373 U.S. at 357. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 "does not give the Com-
mission jurisdiction to review particular instances of enforcement of exchange
rules." Id. Neither does it explicitly provide for exemption from antitrust laws. See
id. The court stated that there is no check provided for by the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, which would replace the check provided by antitrust laws,
ensuring that the exchanges do not promulgate its rules in a manner injuring
competition without "furthering legitimate self-regulative ends." Id. at 358. Be-
cause in certain instances no check was provided for by Congress, the regulatory
scheme is subject to the external influences, over which the Commission has no
control. See id. at 359. Therefore, the court found that the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934 was not exempt from antitrust laws. See id. at 360.
62. See Behagen, 884 F.2d at 528. The monolithic control given to each NGB,
required that the NGB be autonomous in regulating its sport. See 36 U.S.C.
§ 391(b)(4) (1978) (current version at 36 U.S.C. § 220522(a)(5) (1998)). The
NGBs were also given the power to establish rules regarding eligibility and provide
for means of addressing disputes that arose over eligibility. See Newman, supra
note 43, at 210-11.
63. See Behagen, 884 F.2d at 528-30; 36 U.S.C. §§ 391(b)(4), 391(b)(12),
393(1), 393(7) (1978) (current versions at 36 U.S.C. §§ 220522(a)(5),
220522(a) (14), 220523(a) (1), 220523(a)(7) (1998) respectively). The court ex-
amined the purpose of enacting the Act. See Behagen, 884 F.2d at 528-29. The
court determined that the purpose was to correct administrative deficiencies,
among other things that had been plaguing United States' amateur athletics at the
time. See id. The Act was established to bring order and structure to amateur
athletics through the creation of NGBs. For further discussion of Congress's goal
for creating the Act, see supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
64. See Behagen, 884 F.2d at 525.
65. See Barnes v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 862 F. Supp. 1537 (S.D.W. Va.
1993) (amateur athlete brought suit in district court seeking relief from two year
suspension from competition after testing positive for prohibited substances); see
also Devereaux v. Amateur Softball Ass'n of Am., 768 F. Supp. 618 (S.D. Ohio
1991) (involving action brought by amateur softball player to restrain Association
from, among other things, hosting national tournament); Dolan v. U.S. Equestrian
Team, Inc., 257 N.J. Super. 314 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1992) (equestrian athlete
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Courts have shown disapproval of these attempts to circumvent the
remedies provided under the Act. 66 If a party fails to exhaust all of
the available remedies provided by the Act, a court will usually deny
relief.67
In Devereaux v. Amateur Softball Ass'n of America,68 a group of
amateur softball players brought suit challenging the Association's
implementation of an eligibility rule regarding participation in a
softball competition. 69 The court in Devereaux analyzed the admin-
istrative remedies available to the plaintiffs under the Act.70 The
court concluded that the Act and the rules of the Amateur Softball
Association provided numerous remedies to the plaintiffs. 71 The
court, in dismissing the case, found that bringing suit without ex-
hausting the available remedies was premature. 72
brought suit challenging decision excluding her from team which competed in
world competition).
66. See Mayes, supra note 2, at 124-25 (discussing court's view that plaintiffs
must seek remedies provided by the NGB); see also Nelson, supra note 5, at 188-89
(reviewing court decision requiring eligibility disputes be resolved by arbitration).
67. See D.C. Tire Roadrunners v. Amateur Softball Ass'n of Am., 1995 WL
464276 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (stating due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
"motion for preliminary injunction will be denied as moot"); Barnes v. Int'l Ama-
teur Athletic Fed'n, 862 F. Supp. 1537, 1545-46 (S.D.W. Va. 1993) (holding subject
matter jurisdiction was precluded due to failure to exhaust administrative reme-
dies); Devereaux v. Amateur Softball Ass'n of Am., 768 F. Supp. 618, 624 (S.D.
Ohio 1991) (holding failure to exhaust administrative remedies promulgated by
Association precluded suit challenging player eligibility rule); Dolan v. U.S. Eques-
trian Team, Inc., 257 NJ. Super. 314, 319 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (holding
exhaustion of administrative remedies is condition precedent to bringing suit).
68. 768 F. Supp. 618 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
69. See Devereaux, 768 F. Supp. at 621. The rule, enacted by the Amateur Soft-
ball Association, required players, who play softball outside their residency or em-
ployment state, to file a written affidavit indicating which state association in which
they wished to play. See id. After playing in a state association outside of the
player's state, that player may not play in another state association during the same
year. See id. Players who wished to engage in competition in both Kansas and
Ohio brought the suit. See id. at 621-22. Defendant claimed that the rule was
established to "prevent the mid-season switching of players from one roster to an-
other [which] ... would create chaos because sponsors would continually bid and
trade players throughout the course of a season .. .[which] would be contrary to
the spirit of amateur sports." Id. at 621.
70. See id. at 623-24. The court cited 36 U.S.C. §§ 374(8), 375(a) (5), 382(b),
395 (1978) (current versions at 36 U.S.C. §§ 220503(8), 220505(a) (5), 220509(a),
220527 (1998) respectively) to show the remedies made available to athletes by the
Amateur Sports Act. See id. To view the certain provisions of the statute see supra
notes 44, 46-47 and accompanying text. The court also discussed the disqualifica-
tion procedures of the Amateur Softball Association. See Devereaux, 768 F. Supp. at
623 n.6.
71. See Devereaux, 768 F. Supp. at 623-24. The plaintiff could appeal from the
decision of the Amateur Softball Association. See id. The plaintiff could also file
for arbitration and submit a written complaint with the USOC. See id.
72. See id. at 624.
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In Barnes v. International Amateur Athletic Federation,73 an ama-
teur athlete was suspended from competition for testing positive for
a prohibited substance and brought suit seeking an injunction of
the suspension and damages.7 4 The Southern District of West Vir-
ginia found that the plaintiff did not exhaust all the administrative
remedies available to him.75 The question for review was whether
the plaintiff was required to exhaust all possible remedies.7 6 The
court began its analysis by noting that the intent of Congress "is
critical to any exhaustion inquiry. '7 7 The court then determined,
by analyzing provisions of the statute and legislative history, that
Congress intended athletes to exhaust all administrative remedies
73. 862 F. Supp. at 1537 (S.D.W. Va. 1993).
74. See id. at 1539. The plaintiff, at the time the action was filed, held the
world record in the shot put. See id. On August 7, 1990, the plaintiff tested posi-
tive for the prohibited substance methyltestosterone and received a two-year sus-
pension from athletic competition. See id. The plaintiff sought the injunction
primarily to prohibit his exclusion from the Olympic trials; a competition that de-
termines which athletes shall compete in the Olympics. See id.
75. See id. at 1542. The plaintiff appealed the suspension to The Athletics
Congress of America's Doping Appeals Board. See id. The Board upheld the sus-
pension, and the plaintiff subsequently chose not to seek other remedies that were
available. See id. The plaintiff had the option to seek arbitration of the unfavora-
ble decision rendered by The Athletics Congress of America. See id. at 1544.
76. See id. at 1542. The plaintiff claimed that he was not required to exhaust
all remedies, citing McCarthy v. Madigan. See id. In McCarthy, the court held that a
federal prisoner does not have to exhaust the Bureau of Prisons' administrative
procedure in order to initiate an action solely for money damages. See McCarthy v.
Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 156 (1991).
77. Barnes, 862 F. Supp. at 1542 (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 530 U.S. 140
(1991)) (elaborating criteria used in determining issues requiring exhaustion of
remedies). Exhaustion of remedies serves the purpose of protecting administra-
tive authority and promoting judicial efficiency. See McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144-46.
When Congress expressly states that exhaustion is required, then that intent is
followed. See id. at 144. When the intent of Congress is nebulous, however, then it
is up to the court's discretion to determine if exhaustion is required. See id. The
court will weigh the statutory interest favoring exhaustion against the individuals
right to have access to the courts. See id. at 146. The court will always be mindful
of the statutory scheme put forth by Congress. See id. at 144. An individual's inter-
ests supercede that of administrative exhaustion in three situations:
First, exhaustion is not required where resort to the administrative rem-
edy may occasion undue prejudice to pursuit of a future court action...
Second, an administrative remedy may be inadequate if the agency lacks
the power to grant effective relief or the challenge is to the adequacy of
the agency procedure .... Third, exhaustion may be inadequate if the
administrative body is shown to be biased or has otherwise predeter-
mined the issue.
Barnes, 862 F. Supp. at 1543 (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 (1991)).
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when challenging eligibility standards. 78 Since the plaintiff had not
done so, the case was dismissed. 79
3. Availability of Private Right of Action
In some suits over eligibility requirements, courts do not even
proceed as far as addressing issues of implied exemptions or ex-
haustion of remedies.80 Rather, these courts merely analyze
whether the party who brings suit has a right to a private cause of
action under the Act.81 Many courts have held that a private right
of action does not exist to athletes bringing suit under the Act.82
In Oldfield v. Athletic Congress,83 a world class shot putter
brought suit after the Athletic Congress suspended his amateur sta-
78. See Barnes, 862 F. Supp. at 1543-44. The court focused on the general
events that led Congress to enact the Act in 1978. See id. at 1543. The court dis-
cussed the problems that faced amateur athletes during that time and the impor-
tance of correcting the disorder that was present in amateur athletics. See id.
The court placed significant weight on the fact that Congress instilled the
USOC with "exclusive jurisdiction" over amateur sports. Id. (internal annotations
omitted). The court also noted that the USOC had the power to recognize na-
tional governing bodies. See id. These national governing bodies, recognized for
each particular sport, are given monolithic control over its particular sport and can
establish criteria for eligibility. See id. For further discussion of the USOC and
national governing bodies, see supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
Then, in conducting an analysis of the Act's drafting, the court stated that
Congress omitted from the final draft, language that would have provided federal
district courts with special jurisdiction for injunction proceedings. See id. at 1544.
Taking these factors into account, the court found that Congress made clear
choices to keep disputes that arise with regard to eligibility out of the courts. See
id. Therefore, the court held that Congress clearly intended for the exhaustion of
administrative remedies. See id.
79. See Barnes, 862 F. Supp. at 1546.
80. See Newman, supra note 43, at 212-13 (noting courts typically dismiss ac-
tions brought by amateur athletes against Olympic governing bodies); see also
Mack, supra note 10, at 666-69 (reviewing cases where courts find no private action
available to plaintiff); Mayes, supra note 2, at 125 (discussing court's ruling that
Amateur Sports Act provides no private right of action); Nafziger, supra note 10, at
509.
81. See Oldfield v. Athletic Cong., 779 F.2d 505, 506-07 (9th Cir. 1985) (deter-
mining if athlete who signed professional contract had cause of action against ama-
teur athletic organizations which disqualified him from participation in amateur
athletics); Michels v. United States Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155, 156-58 (7th Cir.
1984) (deciding if weight lifter who failed drug tests could bring suit in district
court to challenge suspension); DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Comm., 492 F.
Supp. 1181, 1182-83 (D.D.C. 1980) (considering action brought by athletes against
USOC for its decision not to send team to XXIInd Olympiad).
82. See Oldfleld, 779 F.2d at 508 (holding Olympic athlete did not have cause
of action against The Athletic Congress); Michels, 741 F.2d at 157 (ruling weight
lifter had no standing to appeal suspension from USOC); DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at
1189 (holding that USOC could choose not to send team to Olympics for reasons
unrelated to given sport).
83. 779 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1985).
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tus for signing a professional contract with the International Track
Association.8 4 The Ninth Circuit, in construing the language of the
Act, determined that a private cause of action was expressly pro-
vided for by the Act.85 The court was then left to decide if the Act
contained an implied right of action.86 Finding that Congress did
not intend to provide for either an express or implied right of ac-
tion, the court dismissed the case. 87
In Michels v. United States Olympic Committee,8 8 the Seventh Cir-
cuit considered whether an athlete, who had been suspended for
violation of the USOC's drug policy, could bring suit seeking an
84. See id. at 506. Oldfield competed in the 1972 Olympics. See id. He subse-
quently signed a professional contract with the International Track Association in
which he competed professionally for approximately four years. See id. Oldfield
then wished to regain his status as an amateur in order to be eligible to compete in
the 1980 Olympics. See id.
85. See id. at 506-07. The court reviewed the legislative history of the Act and
noted the purpose of the Act was to create a hierarchical structure to oversee ama-
teur athletics. See id. The court determined that the USOC and NGBs were vested
with the power to issue swift resolution to disputes, which arose under the Act. See
id.
86. See id. at 507-08 (reviewing case law involving existence of implied private
right of action). The Ninth Circuit stated there are four factors to consider when
determining if a statute contains an implied private right of action:
(1) [W] hether the plaintiff is a member of a class for whose especial ben-
efit the statute was enacted;
(2) [W]hether there is an indication of Congress's intent to create or
deny a private remedy;
(3) [W]hether a private remedy would be consistent with the statute's
underlying purpose; and
(4) [W]hether the cause of action traditionally is relegated to state law.
Id. (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 (1975)).
The Ninth Circuit, citing the Supreme Court in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
noted that not all prongs of this evaluation should receive equal weight. Oldfield,
779 F.2d at 507 (citing Touche Ross Co. v. Redington, 422 U.S. 560, 575 (1979)).
The court determined that the central inquiry involved whether Congress in-
tended to create an implied private right of action. See id.
87. See Oldfield, 779 F.2d at 506-08 (conducting analysis of statutory provisions
of the Act as well as construing Congress's intent). The Ninth Circuit felt the
intent of Congress in this case was clear. See id. at 507-08. The court stated "[aill
too frequently the intent of Congress is quite obscure. It is seldom as apparent as
it is in the present case." Id. at 507. The court noted that the Act, as originally
proposed, contained a provision that would allow athletes to challenge enacted
rules in federal courts. See id. The athletes were to be able to challenge the prac-
tice of any sports organization, which affected the athletes' right to compete. See
id. This provision was met with severe resistance by high school and college orga-
nizations. See id. A compromise was ultimately reached in which the provision was
removed. See id. Finally the court looked to the "administrative mechanisms for
the resolution of disputes." Id. at 508. Reviewing all these factors, the court held
that an implied private right of action is not present. See id.
88. 741 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1984).
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injunction. 89 The Seventh Circuit conducted a similar evaluation
of the Act as the Ninth Circuit did in Oldfield.90 The court found
that there existed no express or implied private right of action avail-
able for Michels, and thereby dissolved the injunction that had
been issued by the District Court.9 1
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The Fifth Circuit in Eleven Line considered whether the NTSSA
and other defendants, who are state and local associations under
the NGB for the sport of soccer, violated antirust laws in promulgat-
ing its eligibility rules.92 In order to determine if the defendant, a
non-profit corporation, was guilty of violating federal antitrust laws,
the court initially needed to decide if the state association fell sub-
89. See id. at 156. Michels, an amateur weightlifter, competed at the Pan
American Games, which required that all athletes take drug tests. See id. The pur-
pose of the test was to determine if any athletes had consumed testosterone in
violation of the IOC anti-doping rules. See id. (internal quotations omitted).
Michels' level of testosterone exceeded the permissible amount established by the
IOC and he was subsequently suspended for two years. See id. Included in this two-
year suspension was the 1984 Olympics; therefore, Michels was not permitted to
compete for a position on the American weightlifting team. See id. Michels
brought suit in district court, which issued a preliminary injunction. See id.
90. See id. at 157-58. The court found that the Amateur Sports Act was cre-
ated to "settl[e] disputes between organizations seeking to be recognized as the
NGB for a particular sport and to shield amateur athletes from being harmed by
these struggles." Id. at 157.
The Seventh Circuit then declared that the Act does not provide an express
right of action and subsequently investigated the Act to determine if it provides an
implied private cause of action. See id. The court began its analysis by noting the
four factors in determining the existence of an implied cause of action enumer-
ated by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash. See id. For further discussion of the
factors detailed in Cort v. Ash, see supra note 86 and accompanying text. The Sev-
enth Circuit then deferred to more recent decisions by the Supreme Court indicat-
ing that the paramount determination in the analysis is that of congressional
intent. See Michels, 741 F.2d at 157 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v.
Curran, 456 U.S. 66, 95 (1975)). "Once Congress's intent is determined, there is
no need to 'trudge through all four of the factors' in Cort v. Ash." Id. at 158 (quot-
ing Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 95).
91. See Michels, 74 F.2d at 158. Because the court determined that the intent
of Congress was the predominant factor in determining the existence of an im-
plied right of action, the Seventh Circuit analyzed the legislative history and provi-
sion of the Act. See id. It found that certain provisions establishing judicial
remedies for athletes were dropped from the enacted Act. See id. The court also
noted a speech supporting the Act was given to USOC House Delegates where it
was mentioned that athletes have the ability to redress their problems through
arbitration. See id. The court, therefore, concluded that Congress did not intend
to create an implied private right of action. See id.
92. See Eleven Line v. N. Tex. State Ass'n, 213 F.3d 198, 205 (5th Cir. 2000)
(noting that court must determine if defendants are even subject to antitrust laws).
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ject to these laws. 93 The Fifth Circuit began its analysis with a dis-
cussion of the Act, its provisions for amateur athletics in the United
States and the authority it grants to the USOC and NGBs. 94 The
court determined that NGBs, which must "demonstrate autonomy
in the governance of its sport," serve a vital role in the hierarchy
formulated by Congress.95
The Fifth Circuit then turned to the defendant's argument
that the Act exempts the NTSSA from federal antitrust laws.96 The
NTSSA contended, citing Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n, that its
unsanctioned play rule should escape scrutiny for antitrust viola-
tion.97 The defendants evinced that the court in Behagen found the
Act provides an implied exemption from antitrust laws.98
The Fifth Circuit reiterated the court's finding in Behagen that
Congress intended to allow "NGBs to exercise monolithic control
93. See id. at 205 (addressing defendant's argument that they are exempt from
the reach of federal antitrust laws). The main defendant, NTSSA, is a "national
state association" and a member of the USSF, the national governing body for the
sport of soccer in the United States. Id. at 201. On appeal, the defendant claims
the intent of Congress in enacting the Act was to exclude groups, such as the
defendants from federal antitrust violations. See id. at 204. The defendants also
cite the holding in Behagen, to indicate that they should be immune from these
laws. See id.
94. See id. at 203 (describing vertical structure implemented by Act). The
court explained that the Act established a vertical structure to ensure proper or-
ganization and efficiency throughout United States amateur sports. See id. At the
top of the hierarchy is the USOC, which oversees all United States amateur sports
that appear in the Olympics. See id. at 203. The USOC recognizes NGBs for each
particular sport. See id. In the present case, the NGB for soccer in the United
States is the USSF. See id. at 201. The NGB can recognize state associations to
oversee the administration of the particular sport in a particular state. See id. Here
the state association, which was recognized by the USSF for the sport of soccer in
North Texas, is the NTSSA. See id.
95. Id. at 203 (indicating that NGB has broad range of authority in overseeing
and regulating its individual sport); see also 36 U.S.C. § 220522 (a) (5) (1998)
(equivalent to § 391(b) (4) of the Act before its amendment in 1998). To demon-
strate an NGB's autonomy, the court concluded through an analysis of 36 U.S.C.
§ 220522(a) (5) of the Act (equivalent to § 391 (b) (4) of the Act before its amend-
ment in 1998) that the NGB "must independently decide[ ] and control[ ] all mat-
ters central to governance; not delegate decision making and control of matters
central to its governance; and be free from outside restraint." Eleven Line, 213 F.3d
at 203 (internal quotations omitted). The court also determined, from § 220523
of the Act (equivalent to § 393 of the Act before the 1998 amendment), that the
NGB should promulgate eligibility standards for amateur athletes, create national
goals for the sport, and oversee competition. See id. at 203-04.
96. See Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 204-05 (discussing Behagen and purpose of Act).
97. See id.
98. See id. (indicating that court should follow holding in Behagen and find
defendants exempt from antitrust laws); see also Behagen v. Amateur Basketball
Ass'n, 884 F.2d 524, 529-30 (10th Cir. 1989) (discussing antitrust immunity under
Amateur Sports Act); see generally Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963)
(analyzing implied exemptions from federal antitrust laws).
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over a particular sport, and the NGB could exercise such control
without fear of violating the federal antitrust laws." 99 The court
subsequently determined that the exemption found by the Tenth
Circuit was an implied exemption, because the Act did not provide
an express exemption.100 Although Behagen held that an implied
antitrust exemption, which is generally disfavored, existed for the
NGB, the Fifth Circuit agreed that Behagen was properly
adjudicated. 10 1
In applying Behagen, the Fifth Circuit distinguished Eleven Line
and held that the defendants were not immune from federal anti-
trust law through an implied exemption. 10 2 In doing so, the court
highlighted certain facts that it used to indicate the defendant
should not be exempt.1 0 3 Primarily, the court believed the defen-
dant in Behagen occupied a different level in the hierarchy of ama-
teur sports than did the defendants in Eleven Line.10 4  The
defendant in Behagen was an NGB, while the defendants in Eleven
Line were state and local associations. 10 5
An additional factor the Fifth Circuit identified was the rule
itself 10 6 The court noted that the USSF neither issued nor ap-
proved the NTSSA's unsanctioned play rule, and the NTSSA was
the only organization of its type to enact such a rule. 10 7 The ratio-
nale the defendants provided for establishing the rule also did not
persuade the court. 108 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit believed that
99. Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 204 (interpreting statutory language and legisla-
tive history to determine congressional intent).
100. See id. (indicating no express provision exists under Act exempting ac-
tions taken by defendant from antitrust laws). The court noted that finding an
implied exemption is generally not favored. See id. The court further asserted that
implied antitrust exemptions should rarely be found. See id. (citing Silver, 373 U.S.
at 357). The court stressed that finding an implied exemption should only occur
when it is "necessary to the operation of another statutory scheme," and even then,
should be used sparingly. Id.
101. See id. (agreeing that existence of antitrust exemption was Congress's
intent).
102. See id. (explaining that while Behagen case was correctly decided, certain
facts of this case rendered different analysis and application of rule).
103. See id.
104. SeeEleven Line, 213 F.3d at 204. The court focused on this fact as a major
factor in distinguishing this case from Behagen. See id.
105. See id. The court appears to indicate that an exemption would be found
had the suit been brought against the USSF and the NGB. See id.
106. See id. at 205 (enumerating reason to distinguish Behagen from present
cases).
107. See id. at 204-05.
108. See id. The defendants stated that the purpose of establishing the un-
sanctioned play rule was "(1) to deter fraudulent or mistaken insurance claims on
the policy that covers players, (2) to maintain uniform discipline over the players,
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such a rule was unnecessary for the administration of amateur soc-
cer. 109 Since there was no need for the rule and it was not ap-
proved by the USSF, the court held that the defendants were not
exempt from federal antitrust law. 110
The court then discussed situations in which an exemption
from antitrust laws could have been found. 1 ' The court noted that
had the USSF expressly approved the rule, the case would fall
under the umbrella of Behagen.1 12 Also, had other associations en-
acted similar eligibility rules, the court would have found the rule
more essential to the management of the sport.113 Finally, the
court implied that it would look more favorably on the rule, if a
valid reason had been given by the defendants for its enactment.' 14
It is interesting to note that the court mentions several times in
the end of its analysis that the USSF did not issue or approve the
unsanctioned play rule.'1 5 The court, however, in recounting the
facts in its Background, explicitly states that the "unsanctioned play
and (3) to control the quality and safety of facilities." Id. at 203. The court did not
feel the reasons articulated provided "a convincing rationale related to [the] man-
agement of amateur soccer in the area." Id. at 205.
109. See Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 205 (finding no valid rationale for enacting
rule, which was not approved and added little to administration of amateur
soccer).
110. See id. The court noted that there could have been scenarios where an
implied exemption from antitrust laws could be maintained. See id. For example,
had other associations instituted the unsanctioned play rule all over the country, it
could be inferred that this rule was necessary for the administration of amateur
soccer. See id. Also, had the USSF enacted the rule or approved the rule, it would
fall under the implied exemption found in Behagen. See id.
111. See Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 204-05 (noting if certain facts in case had
been different, defendant would have been found exempt from antitrust laws).
112. See id. (specifying that player eligibility rule exemption established in
Behagen would be present had USSF approved rule).
113. See id. The court attempted to determine the importance and benefit
that the unsanctioned play rule would add to amateur soccer. See id. It held that
the rule was not necessary for the administration of amateur soccer. See id. at 205.
In making this determination, the court noted that no other state association had
enacted a rule similar to the unsanctioned play rule. See id. at 204. The Fifth
Circuit also noted, in support of its proposition, this rule was unnecessary because
there were few facilities, which refused to become sanctioned facilities. See id. Had
there been more upheaval by facilities regarding the rule, then the court indicated
this would "threaten [the NTSSA's] effectiveness as a ... state association." Id. at
205.
114. See id. at 205 (indicating more convincing rationale would give stronger
case for exemption). For further discussion on the rationale the defendant com-
municated to the court, see supra note 108.
115. See id. at 201, 204-05 (revealing explicit contradiction in statement by
court). The Fifth Circuit strongly suggested that had the USSF approved the un-
sanctioned play rule, it would have found the defendants exempt from antitrust
laws. See id. The court then repeatedly indicated that "USSF neither issued the
NTSSA unsanctioned play rule nor explicitly approved it." Id. at 204.
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rule . . .was reviewed and approved by the USSF according to
USSF's regulations."'1 16 This discrepancy was never addressed by
the court.
After the court determined that the defendants were not ex-
empt from antitrust laws, it analyzed the novel issue of whether the
defendants, non-profit organizations, could be found guilty of anti-
trust violations.' 17 The court did not conclusively answer this ques-
tion because it determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to
damages."18
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In Eleven Line, the Fifth Circuit incorrectly determined that the
Act did not exempt a state soccer association from antitrust laws.1 19
First, the Fifth Circuit departed from the persuasive authority estab-
lished by the Tenth Circuit's holding in Behagen. 20 Second, the
decision did not consider case law that required plaintiffs to ex-
haust all available administrative remedies before bringing suit.
21
116. Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 201 (internal quotations omitted).
117. See id. at 205-06 (determining parents must conspire to produce harm
for antitrust to be found). The court determined that the unique aspect of this
antitrust suit was that none of the defendants had any economic motive to engage
in anticompetitive activity because participation in soccer is not for profit. See id. at
205. Rather, the court concluded that an antitrust claim can only exist when a co-
conspirator exists. See id.
The only co-conspirators the court could identify were the parents of the chil-
dren who participated in the sport. See id. The organizations which manage ama-
teur soccer are one entity under the USSF, therefore, the court held they could
not be co-conspirators. See id. (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984)). The only other party that could be considered
was the children and the court held they were too young to conspire. See id.
118. See id. at 206-09 (reversing plaintiff's award of damages and indicating
that determination of antitrust violation was irrelevant since damages were not
awarded). The Fifth Circuit deferred analysis of this novel issue by stating that
"[a] lthough this case poses ponderous and unusual antitrust questions, which may
not have been fully explored ... we note them and preserve the issues for a future
day." Id. The court went on to indicate that even if the defendant had been guilty
of antitrust violations, because the plaintiff is not entitled damages, "deficiencies of
the damage are much easier to explain." Id.
119. Compare Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 205 (departing from persuasive authority
set in Behagen) with Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n, 884 F.2d 524, 529-30
(10th Cir. 1989) (holding Act contains implied exemption). Behagen was the first
case to consider if the Act provides antitrust immunity. See generally Nelson, supra
note 5, at 185.
120. Compare Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 205 with Behagen, 884 F.2d at 529-30 (dif-
ferentiating when defendant could be sued in claim for antitrust violations under
Act). The Tenth Circuit held that the Act provides an implied exemption from
antitrust laws for an NGB, while the Fifth Circuit, in Eleven Line, held no such
exemption existed for a state association. See id.
121. See D.C. Tire Roadrunners v. Amateur Softball Ass'n of Am., 1995 WL
464276 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (stating due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
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Finally, the Fifth Circuit did not review rulings that denied a plain-
tiffs private right of action to bring suit under the Act for eligibility
standards. 122 In concluding that the NTSSA was not exempt from
antitrust laws, the court failed to carry out the legislative intent of
the Act.123
A. Distinguishing Behagen
The Fifth Circuit, in its holding, contradicted the persuasive
authority established by the Tenth Circuit in Behagen.124 First, the
Fifth Circuit properly determined that the Tenth Circuit's holding
was valid.125 The court then stated that the Behagen calculus was not
applicable to the case at bar.126
1. Behagen Analysis
The Tenth Circuit in Behagen correctly determined that the Act
provides NGBs with an exemption from antitrust laws. 127 Since the
"motion for preliminary injunction will be denied as moot"); Barnes v. Int'l Ama-
teur Athletic Fed'n, 862 F. Supp. 1537, 1545-46 (S.D.W. Va. 1993) (holding subject
matter jurisdiction was precluded due to failure to exhaust administrative reme-
dies); Devereaux v. Amateur Softball Ass'n of Am., 768 F. Supp. 618, 624 (S.D.
Ohio 1991) (holding administrative remedies promulgated by Association pre-
cluded suit challenging player eligibility rule); Dolan v. U.S. Equestrian Team,
Inc., 257 N.J. Super. 314, 319 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (holding exhaustion
of administrative remedies is a condition precedent to bringing suit).
122. See Oldfield v. Athletic Cong., 779 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding
athlete had no cause of action against amateur athletic organizations that disquali-
fied him from participation in amateur athletics for signing professional contract);
Michels v. United States Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155, 160 (7th Cir. 1984) (hold-
ing weight lifter, who failed drug tests, had no private right of action to challenge
drug suspension); DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181,
1185 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding athletes could not bring action challenging USOC's
decision not to send team to XXIInd Olympiad).
123. See generally Mayes, supra note 2, at 124 (indicating Congress intended
Act, not courts, to provide quick and efficient resolution of disputes); Nelson,
supra note 5, at 185 (addressing Congress's specific acts that indicate their desire
to keep disputes arising under Act out of courtrooms).
124. See Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 204 (noting that Behagen was properly decided
but facts in present case do not lend themselves to Behagen analysis). The court
placed weight on the fact that the defendants were on different rungs of the verti-
cal structure established by the Act. See id. The fact that no other state association
promulgated such a rule also troubled the court. See id.
125. See id. (concurring with Tenth Circuit that defendants in Behagen should
have been exempt from antitrust laws).
126. See id. (holding fact that defendant was not NGB, distinguished present
case from Behagen). The NTSSA, defendant in Eleven Line, is a state association,
while in Behagen the ABA (defendant), was a NGB. See id. The court noted that
this difference was a significant factor setting the two cases apart. See id.
127. See Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n, 884 F.2d 524, 527-30 (10th Cir.
1989) (construing congressional intent to find implied exemption from antitrust
laws exists under the Act).
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Act contains no express exemption, the court analyzed relevant
case law to determine the applicable standard for finding an im-
plied exemption. 128 The court noted, citing Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange129 and United States v. Borden Co., 130 that implied exemp-
tions are strongly disfavored and will be found only if it is the intent
of Congress.' 3 '
The Tenth Circuit then reviewed language of the Act from
§§ 391(a), 391(b)(4), 393(1), 393(7),132 and the legislative history
of the Act. 133  The court took particular notice of § 391(b) (4),
which states that for an NGB to be eligible it must "demonstrate[ ]
that it is autonomous in the governance of its sport, in that it inde-
pendently determines and controls all matters central to such gov-
ernance .... ."134 The court also noted that the legislative history of
the Act indicates that it was created "to correct the disorganization
and the serious factional disputes that seemed to plague amateur
sports in the United States.' 3 5 The court, therefore, properly held
that Congress intended to extend an implied antitrust exemption
128. See id. (indicating nonexistence of express exemption does not end anal-
ysis, courts can also find implied exemptions from antitrust laws). The court con-
tinued by stating that implied exemptions are not favored but can still be found by
the court. See id.
129. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
130. 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
131. See Behagen, 884 F.2d at 528-30 (interpreting congressional intent is key
for chance to find implied exemption); see also Silver, 373 U.S. at 357 (stating that
repeal of antitrust laws is opposed unless there is clear congressional intent); Bor-
den, 308 U.S. at 198 (initiating notions that courts will rarely find implied exemp-
tions); Fried, supra note 58, at 57 (reiterating that if Congress does not intend for
an exemption, no exemption is present). Implied exemptions will be found when
Congress enacts a statute that regulates activities in a particular sector of com-
merce. See Hawley, supra note 60, at 1121. An implied exemption can exist in such
a case because the regulated entity must perform the duties Congress has dictated
even though the performance of these duties may violate antitrust laws. See id.
When such a case arises, the courts will evaluate congressional intent and the lan-
guage of the given statute to determine if Congress sought for such an entity to be
exempt from antitrust laws. See Denger, supra note 61, at 32-33. If the court makes
such a determination, they will not displace the design of Congress. See id.
132. Current versions at 36 U.S.C. §§ 220521(a), 220522(a) (5), 220523(a) (1),
22 05 23 (a) (7) respectively.
133. See Behagen, 884 F.2d at 529-30. For the full provisions of the sections of
the Act and discussion of legislative history, see supra notes 40-47 and accompany-
ing text.
134. 36 U.S.C. § 391(b)(4) (1978) (current version at 36 U.S.C.
§ 220522(a) (5) (1998)) (detailing certain eligibility requirements for NGBs indi-
cating that NGB should provide for settlement of disputes that arise under its gov-
ernance). The Act was established to allow NGBs to act independently to establish
and enforce rules with respect to its individual sport. See id.
135. H.R REP. No. 95-1627, at 8 (1978). For further discussion of the factors
inducing Congress to enact the Amateur Sports Act, see supra note 40-47 and ac-
companying text.
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to all NGBs.136 The purpose of this exemption was to ensure that
NGBs could exercise complete control over their sports and correct
the serious deficiencies that were disrupting amateur sports at that
time, without apprehension of violating antitrust laws. 137
2. Departure from Congressional Intent
The Fifth Circuit in Eleven Line incorrectly held that the de-
fendants were not exempt from federal antitrust laws. 138 The court
determined that because the defendants were state and local as-
sociations whose eligibility rule was not approved by its NGB, they
were not exempt. 139 In Behagen on the other hand, the defendant
was an NGB who took direct action affecting the plaintiff.1 40
136. See Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 205 (noting that Tenth Circuit in Behagen was
correct in concluding exemption was present).
137. See Behagen, 884 F.2d at 529-30.
138. Compare Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 204 with Behagen, 884 F.2d at 524 (differ-
entiating between finding implied exemption under Amateur Sports Act and find-
ing no exemption). The court in Eleven Line cites only to Behagen as court
authority to determine the question of exemption under the Act. See Eleven Line,
213 F.3d at 204.
Many other cases have dealt with issues of bringing suit under the Act, but
they do not involve the specific question of antitrust violations. See e.g., Oldfield v.
Athletic Cong., 779 F.2d 505, 510 (9th Cir. 1985) (determining if athlete, who
signed professional contract, had cause of action against amateur athletic organiza-
tions which disqualified him from participation in amateur athletics); Michels v.
United States Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1984) (deciding if
weight lifter who failed drug tests could bring suit in district court to challenge
suspension); Barnes v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 862 F. Supp. 1537, 1540
(S.D.W. Va. 1993) (testing positive banned substances led to two year suspension
for athlete, in which he brought suit seeking injunctive relief); Devereaux v. Ama-
teur Softball Ass'n of Am., 768 F. Supp. 618, 620 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (action brought
by amateur softball player against Association for eligibility rules with regard to
national tournaments); DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp.
1181, 1185 (D.D.C. 1980) (considering action brought by athletes against USOC
for its decision not to send team to XXIInd Olympiad); Dolan v. U.S. Equestrian
Team, Inc., 257 N.J. Super. 314, 319 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (excluding
equestrian athlete from competing in world competition led to suit challenging
decision).
139. See Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 204-05 (distinguishing Eleven Line from
Behagen). The court reads Behagen narrowly, construing at first that an exemption
is only available for an NGB or a state association that has acted with the approval
of its NGB. See id. The court then expands this limited view by indicating that had
the rule been more tailored to effect the NTSSA's management of amateur soccer,
an exemption could have been found. See id.
140. See Behagen, 884 F.2d at 526. The defendant, the American Basketball
Association, enforced a rule regarding the eligibility of a player who played profes-
sionally and wished to regain his amateur status. See id. Behagen did not comply
with this rule and subsequently was not allowed to compete as an amateur. See id.
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The facts with which the Fifth Circuit is troubled are not suffi-
cient to distinguish Eleven Line from Behagen.14  First, Behagen rec-
ognized it was Congress's intent to establish a vertical hierarchy
within amateur sports, which placed significant power in the respec-
tive NGBs. 142 Although an NGB has the authority to recognize state
associations to assist the NGB in effectuating its goals, the NGB
must, in order to qualify and remain an NGB, continue to be "au-
tonomous in the governance of its sport, in that it independently
determines and controls all matters central to its governance, [and]
does not delegate such determination and control .... ,,143 Thus,
an NGB must have full control over any state associations it recog-
nizes, and the state associations must comply with the rules of the
NGB and the Act. 144 The NTSSA was established under the guise of
the USSF, a NGB, and is bound to the by-laws of the USSF and the
language of the Act. 145
141. See Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 204-05 (describing factors leading Fifth Cir-
cuit to hold defendants accountable for antitrust violations). For discussion of
these factors, see supra notes 95-113 and accompanying text.
142. See Behagen, 884 F.2d at 527-30 (construing language of Act to effectuate
intent of Congress). See generally NAFZIGER, supra note 2, at 171-72 (establishing
national goals carried out through USOC and NGB was purpose of Act); Nelson,
supra note 5, at 176-80 (detailing list of power provided as result of established
hierarchy); Newman, supra note 42, at 209-13 (recounting that Act provides USOC
and NGB broad powers for purpose of governing amateur sports). The Act was
established, according to the Senate Reports, after a continual "lack of leadership
in the national governing body, disagreements between the amateur sports organi-
zation and the national governing body, and an ability of the amateur sports or-
ganization to have a say in the policy decision of the national governing body." S.
REP. No. 95-770, at 3 (1978). In creating the Act, Congress attempted to "correct
this disorganization and resolve the serious factional disputes that were its result."
Id. As a result of a two-year investigation, Congress enacted the Amateur Sports
Act, which established a hierarchical structure headed by the USOC and subse-
quently recognized NGBs. See id.
143. 36 U.S.C. § 391(b)(4) (1978) (current version at 36 U.S.C.
§ 220522(a) (5) (1998)). It is important to note that while the NGB is to be inde-
pendent in control and management of its sport, it must comply with all rules and
regulations of the USOC. See 36 U.S.C. § 393(7) (1978).
144. Compare Bylaws of the United States Soccer Federation, Bylaw 212 § I
(1), (6), http://www.us-soccer.com/members/1918_fin.pdf (Aug. 22, 1998) (re-
quiring state associations to comply with USSF's bylaws and policies and Amateur
Sports Act) with Articles of Incorporation of the Northern Texas Soccer Associa-
tion, Article 2.2.4, http://www.ntxsoccer.org/Bylaws/chl-2.pdf (last visited Oct.
10, 2000) (recognizing superseding authority of USSF and its articles of incorpora-
tion and bylaws). Both the bylaws of the USSF and the Articles of Incorporation
recognize the USSF's authority over the NTSSA, and the subservient status the
NTSSA has with respect to the USSF. See id.
145. See Articles of Incorporation of the Northern Texas Soccer Association,
Article 2.2.4, http://www.ntxsoccer.org/Bylaws/chl-2.pdf (last visited Oct. 10,
2000) (requiring NTSSA to follow rules set forth by USSF and USOC).
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By holding the NTSSA to a different standard than USSF
under antitrust laws, however, the court implies that the NTSSA is
independent from and not bound by the rules of the USSF.146 This
proposition appears to be contrary to the holding in Behagen and
Congress's intent to establish a vertical structure where the author-
ity rests with the USOC and NGBs. 147 Furthering this notion, the
court indicated that had the USSF approved of the eligibility stan-
dard, the case would fall under the Behagen exception. 148 This
statement indicates that there are times when the NTSSA can im-
plement rule changes without having them approved by the USSF,
which would be contrary to the language of the Act and the by-laws
of the USSF. 149
Second, the Fifth Circuit departed from congressional intent
by indicating that analyzing the merits of the unsanctioned play
rule could provide an independent implied exemption. 150 The
court stated that, had other state associations enacted a similar eligi-
146. See Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 204-05 (holding that exemption would be
present had USSF acted, but because NTSSA acted alone, exemption is not pre-
sent). The NTSSA is required to notify the USSF of any change it makes with
respect to rules or bylaws. See Bylaws of the United States Soccer Federation, Bylaw
212 § 1(2), http://www.us-soccer.com/members/1918_fin.pdf (Aug. 22, 1998).
Specifically, all state associations must "submit to the Federation any amendment
to its charter or articles of incorporation, bylaws, rules and regulations not later
than 90 days after adoption of such an amendment," indicating that the two enti-
ties act more as a cohesive unit with a similar goal. Id.
147. See Barnes v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 862 F. Supp. 1537, 1543
(S.D.W. Va. 1993) (stating that NGB has sole authority to enact eligibility rules
regarding amateur athletes); see also Newman, supra note 43, at 210-11 (indicating
Congress instilled power to determine eligibility standards and resolve eligibility
dispute regarding amateur athletics).
148. See Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 204 (addressing fact that rule was imple-
mented by NTSSA, a state association, and was not approved by USSF). The court
was concerned that not only had a state association enacted the rule, but its NGB
was not even aware of it. See id.
149. See id. The bylaws of the USSF directly state that if a state association
makes any changes to its rules, it must notify the USSF. See Bylaws of the United
States Soccer Federation, Bylaw 212 § 1 (2), http://www.us-soccer.com/members/
1918_fin.pdf (Aug. 22, 1998). The Fifth Circuit indicates that the NTSSA could
enact rules without the express consent of the USSF, albeit it might not render it
immune from antitrust violations. See Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 204. This indication
is express in contradiction with the USSF bylaws. See Bylaws of the United States
Soccer Federation, Bylaw 212 § 1 (2), http://www.us-soccer.com/members/
1918_fin.pdf (Aug. 22, 1998).
In addition, Congress intended to provide the NGBs with the power to deter-
mine eligibility standards for its athletes. See 36 U.S.C. § 393(5) (1978) (current
version at 36 U.S.C. § 220523(a) (5) (1998)). Congress expected the NGBs "to ex-
ercise monolithic control over its particular amateur sport." Behagen v. Amateur
Basketball Ass'n, 884 F.3d 524, 529 (10th Cir. 1989).
150. See Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 204-05 (noting that alternatives to "player
eligibility exemption under Behagen," which would allow for implied exemption
from antitrust to be found). The court, after indicating that Eleven Line did not fall
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bility rule or the NTSSA received more opposition to the rule from
its local facilities, finding an implied exemption would be appropri-
ate. 51 The court also indicated that a stronger presumption for an
implied exemption would exist had the defendants provided a
more convincing rationale for enacting the rule. 152
The Act instills an NGB with a great deal of power with respect
to the management of its sport, and expects the NGB to regulate
and provide uniformity within its sport.153 If every state association
could enact its own rule without notifying its NGB, the vertical
structure established by Congress would be bypassed. 154 The same
would be true by holding the USSF and the NTSSA to different
standards. 15 5
under the Behagen exemption, enumerated a list of situations involving implica-
tions of the rule that would allow for an exemption to be found. See id.
151. See Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 204-05 (finding rule served no valuable pur-
pose). Due to the fact that no other association enacted such a rule and other
facilities did not object to the rule, the court believed the rule was not essential to
the management of the sport. See id. The court continued by indicating that had
other facilities refused to become sanctioned facilities, the NTSSA would face a
"freeriding problem that would threaten its effectiveness as a national state associa-
tion." Id. at 205. In this scenario, according to the court, finding an implied ex-
emption would be warranted. See id.
152. See id. The court concluded its analysis of the validity of the rule by stat-
ing the defendants did not have a valid reason for its enactment. See id. The court
cites the defendant's rationale for enacting the rule as "(1) to deter fraudulent or
mistaken insurance claims on the policy that covers players, (2) to maintain uni-
form discipline over the players, and (3) to control the quality and safety of the
facilities." Id. at 203.
153. See 36 U.S.C. §§ 391 (b) (4), 392(a)(1), 393(2), 393(5) (current versions
at 36 U.S.C. §§ 220522(a) (5), 220524(1), 220523(2), 220523(5) (1998) respec-
tively) (creating broad powers for NGBs to establish national goals and policies for
its sport and to enact and enforce all rules and guidelines pertinent to its sport).
For further discussion on the power bestowed to national governing bodies, see
supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
154. See 36 U.S.C. § 393(5) (current version at 36 U.S.C. § 220523(a) (5)
(1998)) (instilling NGBs with power to enact eligibility standards for participation
in its sport); see also Bylaws of the United States Soccer Federation, Bylaw 212 § 1
(1), (2), http://www.us-soccer.com/members/1918_fin.pdf (Aug. 22, 1998) (indi-
cating that member state associations are to comply with USSF's rules and regula-
tions, and any change implemented to rules by state association must be submitted
to USSF). Analyzing the validity of a rule established by the NTSSA without the
consent or approval of the USSF has the same effect as holding that the USSF is
exempt from antitrust laws while the NTSSA is not, merely because one is an NGB
and the other is a state association. See 36 U.S.C. § 393(5) (current version at 36
U.S.C. § 220523(a) (5) (1998)). Both infringe on the intent of Congress through
the bylaws of the organizations. See id.
155. Compare Bylaws of the United States Soccer Federation, Bylaw 212 § I
(1), (6), http://www.us-soccer.com/members/1918_fin.pdf (Aug. 22, 1998) (re-
quiring state associations to comply with USSF's bylaws and policies, and those of
Amateur Sports Act) with Articles of Incorporation of the Northern Texas Soccer
Association, Article 2.2.4, http://www.ntxsoccer.org/Bylaws/ch1-2.pdf (last visited
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This rationale also contradicts precedent established to deter-
mine the existence of an implied exemption to antitrust laws.
156
Courts have held that only when Congress enacts legislation regu-
lating an entity to act in a certain manner, which might violate anti-
trust laws, can an implied exemption be found. 157 If the court, as
suggested in Eleven Line, begins analyzing every individual rule en-
acted to determine if an exemption exists, the court would infringe
on long standing precedent requiring implied exemptions only
when a "clear repugnancy exists between antitrust laws and the reg-
ulatory system.' '1 5
8
Finally, it is important to observe that the court expressly con-
tradicts itself in Eleven Line with respect to the USSF's lack of ap-
proval or knowledge of the unsanctioned play rule. 159  In
describing the facts of the case, the court stated that the USSF ap-
proved the unsanctioned play rule.' 60 Then later, as part of its anal-
ysis, the court continually stated that the USSF never approved of,
or was even aware of the rule. 161 This inconsistency is significant
Oct. 10, 2000) (recognizing superseding authority of USSF and its articles of incor-
poration and bylaws).
156. See United States v. Nat'l Ass'n. of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719-20
(1974) (holding that implied exemptions are not favored and exist only when
there is clear discord between antitrust laws and regulatory system established by
Congress); see also Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 682-91 (1974)
(holding casual repeals of antitrust laws are not allowed, requiring dissonance be-
tween that which is regulated and antitrust laws); Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373
U.S. 341, 357 (1963) (repealing of antitrust laws are, as a "cardinal principle," are
not favored); United States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939) (stating "repeals
[of antitrust laws] by implication are not favored"); Behagen, 884 F.2d at 528 (reit-
erating view that exemption through implication is not preferred). See generally
Fried, supra note 58, at 57 (detailing that Securities and Exchange Act were not
exempt from antitrust laws since Congress did not provide such exemption).
157. See Silver, 373 U.S. at 357 (viewing self regulating goals of the Securities
and Exchange Act did not preempt application of antitrust laws); United States v.
Nat'l Ass'n. of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 718 (1974) (finding implied exemption
is only valid when "a convincing showing of clear repugnancy between the antitrust
laws and the regulatory system"); Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824 (2d
Cir. 1990) (indicating antitrust laws are not enforced when they come into conflict
with those that regulatory scheme permits).
158. United States v. Nat'l Ass'n. Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719-20
(1974).
159. See Eleven Line v. N. Tex. State Soccer Ass'n, 213 F.3d 198, 201, 204-05
(5th Cir. 2000) (expressing that USSF both approved and did not approve of un-
sanctioned play rule).
160. See id. at 201.
161. See id. at 204-05. For specific language of the case stating that the USSF
neither explicitly approved nor had knowledge of the unsanctioned play rule, see
supra note 115-16 and accompanying text.
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because the court appears to imply that it would give more
credence to upholding the rule had the rule been approved.' 62
B. Exhaust Remedies
The court in Eleven Line did not discuss the remedies available
to the plaintiff, or whether the plaintiff attempted to exercise these
remedies. 163 Courts, in dealing with suits over eligibility rules, have
analyzed the remedies provided to the plaintiff by the NGB and
determined whether the plaintiff attempted to exercise these reme-
dies. 164 Courts dismiss these cases when the appropriate remedy
was available under the Act, but was not utilized by the plaintiff'165
Although these cases primarily involve athletes bringing suit for re-
lief from eligibility requirements, such an analysis is relevant in a
case where an individual entrepreneur is seeking relief with respect
to an eligibility rule. 166
162. See id.
163. See generally Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 204-05. The court in Eleven Line only
analyzed whether an implied exemption existed from antitrust suit. See id.
164. See Devereaux v. Amateur Softball Ass'n of Am., 768 F. Supp. 618, 624
(S.D. Ohio 1991) (finding plaintiff could appeal decision of Amateur Softball Asso-
ciation, and could also file for arbitration and submit written complaint to USOC);
see also D.C. Tire Roadrunners v. Amateur Softball Ass'n of Am., 1995 WL 464276
(E.D. Pa. 1995) (stating plaintiff did not seek to have neutral arbitrator resolve
dispute by petitioning to USOC); Barnes v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 862 F.
Supp. 1537, 1545-46 (S.D.W. Va. 1993) (finding plaintiff had option to seek arbi-
tration of unfavorable decision rendered by The Athletics Congress of America);
Dolan v. U.S. Equestrian Team, Inc., 257 N.J. Super. 314, 319 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1992) (holding plaintiff did not exhaust remedies provided for by Act).
165. See D.C. Tire Roadrunners v. Amateur Softball Ass'n of Am., 1995 WL
464276 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (stating preliminary motions for injunctions are consid-
ered moot if available remedies are not exhausted); Barnes v. Int'l Amateur Ath-
letic Fed'n, 862 F. Supp. 1537, 1545-46 (S.D.W. Va. 1993) (holding that court did
not possess subject matter jurisdiction over issue before court); Dolan v. U.S.
Equestrian Team, Inc., 257 N.J. Super. 314, 319 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992)
(holding exhaustion of administrative remedies is condition precedent to bringing
suit); Devereaux v. Amateur Softball Ass'n of Am., 768 F. Supp. 618, 624 (S.D.
Ohio 1991) (holding suit was precluded by administrative remedies which were
not exercised).
166. See 36 U.S.C. §§ 374(3), (4), (8), (9) (1978) (current versions at 36
U.S.C. §§ 220503(3), (4), (8), (9) (1998) respectively) (stating that USOC shall
have exclusive jurisdiction over amateur sports and provide for efficient remedies
for disputes that may arise). For full provision of these sections, see supra notes 44-
46 and accompanying text.
The language of the Act requires the USOC "to provide for the swift resolu-
tion for conflicts and disputes involving amateur athletes, national governing bod-
ies, and amateur sports organizations and protect the opportunity of any amateur
athlete, coach or trainer, manager, administrator or official to participate in ama-
teur athletic competition." 36 U.S.C. § 374(8) (1978) (current version at 36 U.S.C.
§ 220503(8) (1998)). While the statute enumerates a list of those in whom the
USOC provides a swift resolution for disputes, both congressional intent in estab-
lishing the Act and legislative history, indicate that this list is not exclusive. See
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The USSF provides remedies for those involved in amateur
sports by requiring its state associations to "provide for an equitable
and prompt hearing and appeal procedures to guarantee the rights
of individuals to participate and compete."'167 The NTSSA com-
plied with this requirement in its articles of incorporation. 168 The
articles of incorporation specifically provide the availability of "eq-
uitable and prompt hearing and appeal procedures to guarantee
the rights of individuals to participate and compete. 1 69
Congressional intent indicates that an NGB should provide for
swift and efficient resolutions of disputes. 170 In the present case,
the NTSSA provided such a remedy.1 7 1 Eleven Line is not the typical
case of an athlete bringing suit against an eligibility rule. 172 Never-
theless, congressional intent requiring swift resolution of disputes
dictates that this case should fall under the prior case law requiring
Newman, supra note 43, at 210-12. The purpose for enacting the Act was to correct
the disputes among groups with amateur sports, provide the USOC and NGBs with
broad power to enact rules and provide for efficient solutions to disputes and exer-
cise exclusive jurisdiction over amateur sports. See id. Therefore, it appears that
the USOC and NGB are to provide remedies to a broad group of individuals and
entities that are engaged in amateur sports. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1627, at 8 (1978).
167. Bylaws of the United States Soccer Federation, Bylaw 213 § l(a)(11),
http://www.us-soccer.com/members/1918_fin.pdf (Aug. 22, 1998) (establishing
requirements of state associations to provide remedies to disputes).
168. See Articles of Incorporation of the Northern Texas Soccer Association,
Article 2.2.4, http://www.ntxsoccer.org/Bylaws/chl-2.pdf (last visited Oct. 10,
2000) (detailing procedure for filing appeals).
169. Id.
170. See Mayes, supra note 2, at 124-25 (discussing concern of drafters in creat-
ing Act); Nelson, supra note 5, at 179-80 (stating that Act provides "comprehensive
scheme" for regulation of disputes that arise in amateur athletics); see also H.R.
REP. No. 95-1627, at 8 (1978) (providing tool to resolve conflicts and disputes was
primary goal of the Act). The drafters of the Act were troubled with the "retarding
and inhibiting effects that unresolved disputes [had] on America's Olympic ef-
forts." Mayes, supra note 2, at 124. For further discussion of the concerns of Con-
gress leading to the creation of the Act, see supra notes 40-47 and accompanying
text.
171. See Articles of Incorporation of the Northern Texas Soccer Association,
Article 2.2.4, http://www.ntxsoccer.org/Bylaws/chl-2.pdf (last visited Oct. 10,
2000) (establishing remedies for participation in amateur sports).
172. See Barnes v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 862 F. Supp. 1537 (S.D.W. Va.
1993) (involving suit by amateur athlete brought in district court seeking relief
from two year suspension from competition after testing positive for prohibited
substances); Devereaux v. Amateur Softball Ass'n of Am., 768 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.
Ohio 1991) (adjudicating suit brought by amateur softball player to restrain Asso-
ciation from hosting national tournament); Dolan v. U.S. Equestrian Team, Inc.,
257 N.J. Super. 314 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1992) (review suit by equestrian athlete
challenging decision excluding her from team, which competed in world competi-
tion). Amateur athletes seeking relief, instead of entrepreneurial entities, bring
most cases disputing eligibility standards; see also Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 202 (in-
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the plaintiff to exhaust his remedies. 173 By failing to address this
issue, the Fifth Circuit ignored that the plaintiff did not attempt to
appeal the rule.174 Since the plaintiff did not exhaust the remedies
provided to him, the court should have dismissed the case.1 75
C. Private Right of Action
Some courts have held that the Act provides no private right of
action for athletes bringing suit.176 These courts concluded that
the language of the Act and congressional intent indicate that the
Act possesses neither an express or implied right of action.' 77
While these cases primarily deal with the rights of athletes, congres-
sional intent indicates that a broader application of this rule should
be implemented. 178 Given that the purpose of the Act was to estab-
lish uniformity and correct the deficiencies of the administration of
amateur sports, it appears that Congress did not intend to allow
every sole vender to sue because he chose not to comply with the
173. Owners of stadiums participate in amateur sports, albeit in a different
manner than athletes.
174. See Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 202-03 (indicating that plaintiff brought suit
directly to district court). The plaintiff in Eleven Line did not attempt to exercise
the options provided by the NTSSA and the USOC. See id. The plaintiff immedi-
ately brought suit in the district court. See id.
175. See id. For further discussion of why a court should dismiss cases where
the plaintiff does not exercise its remedies, see supra notes 65-79 and accompany-
ing text.
176. See Oldfield v. Athletic Cong., 779 F.2d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding
that Olympic athlete did not have cause of action against Athletic Congress);
Michels v. United States Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155, 156 (7th Cir. 1984) (ruling
weight lifter had no standing to appeal suspension from USOC); DeFrantz v.
United States Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181-83 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that
USOC could choose not to send team to Olympics for reasons not relating to given
sport).
177. See Oldfield, 779 F.2d at 507 (indicating that Congress excluded provision
that would have allowed athletes to bring suits directly to the district court);
Michels, 741 F.2d at 157 (settling disputes between NGBs and athletes was purpose
of Act); DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1181 (D.D.C. 1980) (finding that USOC and
NGBs are to have exclusive jurisdiction over all matters relating to amateur sports).
Congress intended to keep disputes involving amateur athletics out of the
courts. See Nelson, supra note 5, at 182. Courts traditionally dismiss suits brought
to them involving amateur athletics; see also Nafziger, supra note 10, at 509; New-
man, supra note 43, at 212-13. Congress removed a final provision from the Act,
which would have expressly enabled athletes to bring suit in district courts, thereby
clearly indicating their intent to disallow a private right of action. See Nelson, supra
note 5, at 182; Newman, supra note 42, at 211-12.
178. For a review of congressional intent and reasons why the court did not
intend for suit to be brought in district courts, see supra notes 79-90 and accompa-
nying text.
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rules provided.1 79 Therefore, the court should have found that the
NTSSA was immune from suit by the plaintiff.
VI. IMPACT
In Eleven Line, the Fifth Circuit decided that the Amateur
Sports Act did not provide the NTSSA and its member organiza-
tions with an implied exemption from antitrust laws. 180 The plain-
tiff was subsequently allowed to sue state and local organizations for
the enactment of an eligibility standard. 181 This holding raises
problematic issues that could have a negative impact on the future
of amateur sports.
In passing the Act, Congress intended to bring structure to the
disorganization that encompassed amateur sports. 182 The hierar-
chical structure was established to create uniformity throughout
each sport, which a given NGB would oversee. 183 Congress in-
tended this structure to be self sufficient in establishing eligibility
rules and providing remedies for disputes that could arise with re-
spect to each sport. It was clear that courts were not meant to be
involved in such disputes. 184
The Fifth Circuit's finding that the defendants were not pro-
tected from suit under the Act, will cause amateur sports as a whole
to suffer. Such a finding will weaken the power of NGBs and could
lead to the factional disputes and disorganization that led Congress
to pass the Act in the first place. 185 The weakening of the NGB's
power would result, because the aggregate of the state associations
allows the NGB to function in an organized and efficient man-
ner.18 6 While a state association is given some leeway in managing
179. For further discussion of the events, which required Congress to review
the sorrowful state of amateur athletics and exact legislation to correct its deficien-
cies, see supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
180. See Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 204-05. For a discussion of the analysis of
antitrust exemptions, see supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
181. See id.
182. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1627, at 8 (1978) (indicating Congress's purpose in
enacting Act). For further discussion of purpose of creating the Act, see supra
notes 3942 and accompanying text.
183. See Nelson, supra note 5, at 177-83 (discussing power distributed to the
NGB).
184. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1627, at 9 (1978) (providing that NGBs are required
to have certain responsibilities to amateur athletes).
185. For a discussion of the problem that faced amateur athletics before the
Act was passed, see supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
186. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1627, at 12 (1978). The legislative history states that
"[I]t is intended that this act will create a vertical structure governing each sport
... which will include.., all the major interests in that sport from the 'grassroots'
organizations to the national governing bodies." Id.
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its particular sports in its state, decisions with respect to changes or
creation of rules must pass through the NGB. 18 7 Therefore, if a
court allows a state association to promulgate its own rules, the au-
thority of an NGB to oversee its state associations and determine
what rules are suitable for its particular sport would be undercut. 18
It would also allow any outside entrepreneur to try to alter eligibility
rules, enacted for the benefit of the athletes, to suit that entrepre-
neur's economic needs. 189
If these actions occur, the nation could be faced with the trou-
bles that plagued it before the Act was created. 190 The true victims
in such a case would be the future Michael Jordans, Joe Montanas
and Mark McGwires of the country. For they would be forced to
deal with the bureaucracy, factionalism and inefficiency that comes
with disjoint management, instead of focusing their energy and love
of the game to soar above their potential and reach their dreams of
becoming a legend.
Konstantinos Yiannopoulos
187. See Bylaws of the United States Soccer Federation, Bylaw 212 § 1 (1), (6),
http://www.us-soccer.com/members/1918-fin.pdf (Aug. 22, 1998) (establishing
superceding authority of USSF over state associations).
188. See id.
189. See Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 200-01. The plaintiff had the opportunity to
become a sanctioned facility, but for financial reasons decided against it. See id.
190. For a discussion of the troubles that plagued amateur sports, see supra
notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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